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Abstract 
Conditioning is the generally agreed-upon 
method for updating probability distribu­
tions when one learns that an event is cer­
tainly true. But it has been argued that 
we need other rules, in particular the rule 
of cross-entropy minimization, to handle up­
dates that involve uncertain information. In 
this paper we re-examine such a case: van 
Fraassen's Judy Benjamin problem [1987], 
which in essence asks how one might update 
given the value of a conditional probability. 
We argue that-contrary to the suggestions 
in the literature-it is possible to use simple 
conditionalization in this case, and thereby 
obtain answers that agree fully with intu­
ition. This contrasts with proposals such as 
cross-entropy, which are easier to apply but 
can give unsatisfactory answers. Based on 
the lessons from this example, we speculate 
on some general philosophical issues concern­
ing probability update. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
How should one update one's beliefs, represented as a 
probability distribution Pr over some space S, when 
new evidence is received? The standard Bayesian an­
swer is applicable whenever the new evidence asserts 
that some event T � S is true (and furthermore, this 
is all that the evidence tells us). In this case we simply 
condition on T, leading to the distribution Pr{·IT). 
For successful "real-world" applications of probability 
theory so far, conditioning has been a mostly sufficient 
answer to the problem of update. But many people 
have argued that conditioning is not a philosophically 
adequate answer (in particular, [Jeffrey 1983]). Once 
we try to build a truly intelligent agent interacting in 
complex ways with a rich world, conditioning may end 
up being practically inadequate. as well. 
The problem is that some of the information that we 
receive is not of the form "Tis (definitely) true" for 
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any T. What would one do with a constraint such as 
"Pr(T) = 2/3" or "the expected value of some ran­
dom variable on S is 2/3". We cannot condition on 
this information, since it is not an event in S. Yet 
it is clearly useful information. So how should we in­
corporate it? There is in fact a rich literature on the 
subject (e.g., see [Bacchus, Grove, Halpern, and Koller 
1994; Diaconis and Zabell 1982; Jeffrey 1983; Jaynes 
1983; Paris and Vencovska 1992; Uffink 1995]). Most 
proposals attempt to find the probability distribution 
that satisfies the new information and is in some sense 
the "closest" to the original distribution Pr. Certainly 
the best known and most studied of these proposals is 
to use the rule of minimizing cross-entropy [Kullback 
and Leibler 1951] as a way of updating with general 
probabilistic information. This rule can also be shown 
to generalize Jeffrey's rule [Jeffrey 1983], which in turn 
generalizes conditioning. 
But is cross-entropy ( CE) really such a good rule? The 
traditional justifications of CE are that it satisfies vari­
ous sets of criteria (such as those of [Shore and Johnson 
1980]) which, while plausible, are certainly not com­
pelling [Uffink 1995]. Van Fraassen, in a paper entitled 
"A problem for relative information [CE] minimizers 
in probability kinematics" [1981] instead approached 
the question in a different way: he looked at how CE 
behaves on a simple specific example. He calls his ex­
ample the Judy Benjamin (JB) problem; in essence 
it is just the question of how one should update by a 
conditional probability assertion, i.e., "Pr(AIB) = c" 
for some events A, B and c E [0, 1]. 
As we now explain, van Fraassen uncovers what seems 
(to us) to be an unintuitive feature of cross-entropy, 
although in later papers on the same issue he endorses 
CE and a family of other similar rules. Furthermore, 
none of his rules agree with most people's strong in­
tuition about the solution to his problem. The pur­
pose of this paper is to give a new analysis, which is 
based on simple conditionalization, and is (we argue) 
in good agreement with people's expectations. Our 
hope is that the example and our analysis will be an 
instructive study of the subtleties involved in proba­
bility update, and in particular the dangers involved 
in indiscriminately applying supposedly "simple" and 
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"general" rules like CE. 
Van Fraassen explains the JB problem as follows 
[1987]: 
[The story] derives from the movie Private 
Benjamin, in which Goldie Hawn, playing 
the title character, joins the Army. She and 
her platoon, participating in war games on 
the side of the "Blue Army", are dropped in 
the wilderness, to scout the opposition ("Red 
Army"). They are soon lost. Leaving the 
movie script now, suppose the area is di­
vided into two halves, Blue and Red territory, 
which each territory is divided into Head­
quarters Company area and Second Com­
pany area. They were dropped more or less 
at the center, and therefore feel it is equally 
likely that they are now located in one area 
as in another. This gives us the following 
muddy Venn diagram, drawn as a map of the 
area: 
1/4 
Red 2nd 
1/4 
RedHQ 
12 
B !Ue 
They have some difficulty contacting their 
own HQ by radio, but finally succeed and de­
scribe what they can see around them. After 
a while, the office at HQ radios: "I can't be 
sure where you are. If you are in Red ter­
ritory, the odds are 3:1 that you are in HQ 
Company area ... " At this point the radio 
gives out. 
We must now consider how Judy Benjamin 
should adjust her opinions, if she accepts this 
radio message as the sole and correct con­
straint to impose. The question on which we 
should focus is: what does it do to the proba­
bility that they are in friendly Blue territory? 
Does it increase, or decrease, or stay at its 
present level of l /2? 
The intuitive response is that the message should not 
change the a priori probability of 1/2 of being in Blue 
territory. More precisely, according to this response, 
Judy's posterior probability distribution should place 
probability 1/4 on being at each of the two quad­
rants in the Blue territory, probability 3/8 on being 
in the Headquarters Company area of Red territory, 
and probability 1/8 on being in the Second Company 
area of Red territory. Van Fraassen [1987] notes that 
his many informal surveys of seminars and conference 
audiences find that people overwhelmingly give this 
answer. 
However, this intuitive answer is inconsistent with 
cross-entropy. In fact, it can be shown that cross­
entropy has the rather peculiar property that if HQ 
had said "If you are in Red territory, the odds are 
o: : 1 that you are in HQ company area ... ", then for 
all o: f: 1, the posterior probability of being in Blue 
territory (according to the distribution that minimizes 
cross-entropy and satisfies this constraint) would be 
greater than 1/2; it would stay at 1/2 only if o: = 1. 
This seems (to us, at least) highly counterintuitive. 
Why should Judy come to believe she is more likely to 
be in Blue territory, almost no matter what the mes­
sage says about o:? For example, what if Judy knew 
in advance that she would receive such a message for 
some a f: 1, and simply did not know the value of 
o:. Should she then increase the probability of being 
in Blue territory even before hearing the message? As 
van Fraassen [1981] says, as part of an extended dis­
cussion of this phenomenon: 
It is hard not to speculate that the dangerous 
implications of being in the enemy's head­
quarters area are causing Judy Benjamin to 
indulge in wishful thinking ... 1 
However, as van Fraassen points out (crediting Peter 
Williams for the observation), there also seems to be a 
problem with the intuitive response. Presumably there 
is nothing special about hearing the odds of being in 
Red territory are 3:1. The posterior probability of be­
ing in Blue territory should be 1/2 no matter what 
the odds are, if we really believe that this information 
is irrelevant to the probability of being in Blue terri­
tory. But if o: = 0 then, to quote van Fraassen [1987], 
"he would have told her, in effect, 'You are not in Red 
Second Company area'". Assuming that this is indeed 
equivalent, it seems that Judy could have used simple 
conditionalization, with the result that her posterior 
probability of being in Blue territory would be 2/3, 
not 1/2. 
In [van Fraassen 1987; van Fraassen, Hughes, and 
Harman 1986], van Fraassen and his colleagues for­
mulate various principles that they argue an update 
rule should satisfy. Their first principle is motivated 
by the observation above and simply says that, when 
conditioning seems applicable, the answer should be 
that obtained by conditioning. To state this more pre­
cisely, let q = o:/(l+o:) be the probability (rather than 
the odds) of being in red HQ company area given that 
Judy is in Red territory. In the case of the JB problem, 
the first principle becomes: 
If q = 1 the prior is transformed by simple 
conditionalization on the event "Red HQ area 
or Blue territory"; if q = 0 by simple condi­
tionalization on "Red 2nd company area or 
Blue territory". 
1We remark that this behavior of CE has also been dis­
cussed and criticized in a more general setting [Seidenfeld 
1987]. 
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This first principle already eliminates the intuitive 
rule, i.e., the rule that the posterior probability should 
stay at 1/2 no matter what q is. (Note also that we 
cannot make the rule consistent with this principle by 
trea.ting q = 0 and q = 1 as special cases, unless we are 
prepared to accept a rule that is discontinuous in q.) 
For van Fraassen, this is apparently a decisive refuta­
tion of the intuitive rule, which he thus says is flawed 
[van Fraassen 1987]. 
However, in this paper we give a new2 and simple anal­
ysis of the JB problem. We believe that our solution is 
well-motivated, and it agrees completely with the in­
tuitive answer. It thus also does not exhibit the coun­
terintuitive behavior of CE. 
Our basic idea is simply to use conditioning, but to do 
so in a larger space where it makes sense (i.e., where 
the information we receive is an event). Of course, 
people have always realized that this option is avail­
able. It is perhaps not popular because it appears to 
pose certain serious philosophical and practical prob­
lems as a general approach. In particular, which larger 
space do we use? There may be many equally natural 
possibilities, leading to different answers, so the rule 
will be indeterminate. Also possible is that all ex­
tended spaces we can think of seem equally unnatural 
and contrived; again, we will be stuck. In addition, 
there is the practical concern that a rich enough space 
might be vastly larger and more complicated to work 
in than the original. 
Against this, a rule like cross-entropy seems extremely 
attractive. It provides a single general recipe which 
can be mechanically applied to a huge space of up­
dates. Even families of rules, such as van Fraassen 
proposes, are not so bad: after one has chosen a rule 
(usually by selecting a single real-valued parameter 
[Uffink 1995]), the rest is again mechanical, general, 
and determinate. Furthermore, all these rules work in 
the original spaceS, without requiring expansion, and 
so may be more practical in a computational sense. 
Since all we do in this paper is analyze one particular 
problem, we must be careful in making general state­
ments on the basis of our results. Nevertheless, they 
do seem to support the claim that sometimes, the only 
"right" way to update, especially in an incompletely 
specified situation, is to think very carefully about the 
real nature and origin of the information we receive, 
and then (try to) do whatever is necessary to find a 
suitable larger space in which we can condition. If 
this doesn't lead to conclusive results, perhaps this is 
because we do not understand the information well 
enough to update with it. However much we might 
wish for one, a genemlly satisfactory mechanical rule 
such as cross-entropy, which saves us all this question­
ing and work, probably does not exist. 
2 Although we are aware of no published analysis simi­
lar to our own, we have learned that Seidenfeld has earlier 
presented a closely related analysis in several lectures [Sei­
denfeld 1997]. 
This does not deny the usefulness of rules like CE. 
There will be some (perhaps large) family of situations 
in which CE is indeed appropriate, and we would like 
to better understand what this family is and how to 
recognize it. But if CE (or any other rule) is blindly 
applied whenever the information is of the appropriate 
syntactic form, we should not be surprised if the results 
are often unexpected and unhelpful. 
2 CONDITIONING 
In this section, we present our alternative analysis of 
the JB problem. In the following, let B1, B2, R�, R2 
denote the events that Judy is in, respectively, Blue 
HQ, Blue Second Company, Red HQ, and Red Second 
Company areas. Let B = B1 V B2 and R = R1 V R2. The message HQ sent, "If you are in Red territory, 
the odds are 3:1 that you are in HQ Company area", 
is equivalent to asserting that the conditional proba­
bility of R1 given R is true is 3/4. In general, let M(q) 
be the similar message asserting that this probability 
is q E [0, lj for some q not necessarily = 3/4 (i.e., the 
announced odds are q/(1 - q) : 1 instead of 3 : 1). 
We use Prjrior to denote Judy's prior beliefs (i.e., be­
fore the message is received) and Prj to denote her 
posterior distribution after receiving M(q). 
The key step is to re-examine the problem from the be­
ginning, and ask ourselves how Judy should treat HQ's 
message. Note that Van Ftaassen explicitly assumes, 
in his statement of the problem, that HQ's statement 
should be treated as a constraint on Judy's beliefs. 
Thus, he interprets it as an imperative: "Make your 
beliefs be such that this is true!" This interpretation 
of probabilistic information as constraints is a common 
one (especially in the context of CE), but is difficult 
to justify [Uffi.nk 1996]. Van Fraassen is, of course, 
quite aware of the philosophical issues raised by his 
interpretation; see [van Fraassen 1980]. 
But is the interpretation that HQ's statement should 
be regarded as a constraint on Judy's beliefs the only 
possible one? Note that, as the story is presented, it 
certainly sounds as though HQ was trying to give Judy 
some true and useful information. But, at the time 
M is sent, the statement that Prjriar(RtJR) = 3/4 is 
clearly not true of Judy's beliefs. Thus, if we wish to 
interpret M as referring directly to Judy's beliefs, we 
will be unable to regard it as a factual assertion in any 
straightforward sense. 
But suppose we instead view M(q) as being a cor­
rect statement regarding HQ 's beliefs; i.e., as asserting 
PrnQ(RtJR) = q where PrnQ denotes HQ's distribu­
tion over where Judy might be. This certainly seems 
to be a reasonable interpretation in light of the story. 
How should Judy react to it? Unfortunately, the story 
does not give us enough information to be able to pro­
vide a definite answer to this question. Judy's correct 
reaction to the message depends on aspects of the situ­
ation that were not included in the problem statement. 
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The following is a partial list of things that could be 
relevant: What does Judy know about HQ's beliefs 
and knowledge? How did HQ expect Judy to react to 
the message, and what did Judy know about these ex­
pectations? What messages could HQ have sent? For 
instance , might HQ have sent M(q) for some other 
value of q if it were appropriate, or would it have said 
something else entirely if q # 3/4? Does Judy believe 
that HQ even has the option of sending messages that 
are not of the form M(q); if so, what messages?3 And 
so on. 
We now give one particular analysis, which follows by 
filling in such missing details in what we feel is a plau­
sible way. As we said, we assume that M(3/4) is a fac­
tual statement about HQ's beliefs. We further assume 
that, no matter what HQ actually knows, its message 
would always have been simply M(q) for the appropri­
ate value of q. Thus, Judy can read nothing more into 
M(q) other than to regard it as a true statement about 
HQ's beliefs. As noted in the previous paragraph , even 
to get this far relies on several strong assumptions . 
Once Judy hears M(q), it seems natural to want to 
condition on it. The problem is that, as yet, we 
have not introduced a space in which M(q) is an 
event. Of course, there are many possible such spaces. 
To construct an appropriate one, we must consider 
how Judy models HQ's beliefs, and what she believes 
about these beliefs. Again, here we make perhaps 
the simplest possible choice. We suppose that Judy 
models HQ's beliefs as a distribution over the four 
quadrants R1, R2, B1, B2. Let Pr��c be the distribu-
tion on { R11 R2, B11 B2} such that Pr��c ( R1) = a, 
P a ,b,c (R ) b p a,b,c(B ) p a,b,c(B ) r HQ 2 = , r HQ 1 = c, r HQ 2 = 
1 - a - b - c. Thus the set of all possible distri­
butions HQ might have, given our assumptions, is 
PHQ = {Pr��cla,b,c2:0, a+b+c�l}. In the 
following, we view PrnQ(R1 IR), PrHQ(RI) , PrHQ(B), 
and so on, as random variables on the space P HQ· 
Thus, for example, "Pr nQ(R1IR) < q" denotes the 
event {Pr��c I Pr';;�c (R1IR) < q}. 
Again, we stress that we are not forced to use P HQ· 
Judy might actually have a richer model of HQ's be­
liefs (e.g., she might think that HQ makes finer geo­
graphical distinctions than simply the four quadrants) 
or a coarser model (e.g., Judy might take as the space 
of possibilities the possible values of PrnQ(RliR), and 
not reason about the rest of HQ's distribution). How­
ever, given the description of the story, PHQ seems to 
be the most natural space for Judy to model her beliefs 
3To see the possible relevance of this, note that if there 
are other possible messages, then the very fact that HQ's 
first message was not one of these others could be impor­
tant information in and of itself: Judy might reason that 
M(3/4) must have been the most important fact HQ pos­
sessed. On the other hand, since the radio died before the 
message was completed, such inferences depend heavily on 
the protocol Judy expects HQ to follow. 
about HQ's beliefs. 
Since Judy does not know what HQ actually believes, 
her beliefs will be a distribution over distributions, 
i.e., a distribution over PnQ· Which distribution? 
Again, we have many choices, but a natural one is 
to suppose that before Judy hears the message, she 
considers a uniform distribution over (a, b, c) tuples . 
Formally, we consider the distribution function defined 
by Prj7�q{Pr�8c I a::; A,b::; B,c::; C}) =ABC, 
so that the density function is just 1. We also use the 
notation Prj/HQ to denote Judy's beliefs about HQ's 
beliefs after receiving M(q). 
It might be thought that, having decided to take PHQ 
as the set of possible beliefs that HQ could have and 
given the (implicit) assumption that Judy is initially 
completely ignorant of HQ's beliefs, the prior density 
on P HQ is determined completely. Unfortunately, this 
is not the case. There is no unique "uniform distribu­
tion" on PnQ· Uniformity depends on how we choose 
to parameterize the space. We have chosen to param­
eterize the elements of this space by a triple (a, b, c) 
denoting the probabilities of R1, R2, and Bt, respec­
tively. However, we could have chosen to characterize 
an element of the space by a triple (a', b', c') denot­
ing the square of the probabilities of R1, R2, and B1, 
respectively. Or perhaps more reasonably, we could 
have chosen to characterize an element by a triple 
(a11, b1 , c") denoting the probability of R, the probabil­
ity of R1 given R, and the probability of B1 given B. 
A uniform distribution with respect to either of these 
parameterizations would be far from uniform with re­
spect to the parameterization we have chosen, and vice 
versa.4 This is, of course, just an instance of the well­
known impossibility of defining a unique notion of 'l.mi­
form in a continuous space [Howson and Urbach 1989]. 
Since M(q) is an event in the new space 'PHQ, Judy 
should be able to condition on it. One might object 
that, since M(q) is an event of measure 0, condition­
ing is not well defined. This is t rue, but there are 
two (closely related) ways of dealing with this prob­
lem. The more elementary and intuitive approach is 
based on the observation that, in practice, HQ w ill 
not (in general) be able to announce its value for 
PrnQ(RI IR) exactly, since this could require HQ to 
announce an infinite-precision real number. It seems 
more reasonable to regard the announced value of q 
as being rounded or approximated in some fashion. In 
particular, we might suppose that M(q) really means 
PtHQ(RIIR) E [q - E, q + e) for some small value 
E > 0. This event has non-zero probability according 
to Prj7�'Q, and so conditioning is unproblematic. 
4We note, however, that the uniform densities with 
respect to all 4 possible parameterizations that involv­
ing choosing 3 out of the 4 probabilities from PrnQ(Rt), 
PrnQ(R2), PrnQ(Bt), PrnQ(Bz) do lead to the same dis­
tribution over PnQ. and so o ur decision to use the first 
three of these probabilities does not affect our analysis. 
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The second approach directly invokes the standard def­
inition of conditioning on (the value of) a random 
variable. We briefly review the details here. Sup­
pose we have two random variables X and Y. If 
Pr(X = a) > 0, then Pr(Y = bJX = a) is just 
defined as Pr(Y = b (l X = a)/ Pr(X = a) as we 
would expect. If Pr(X = a) = 0, then we take the 
straightforward analogue of this definition using den­
sity functions. If fxy(x, y) is the joint density function 
for X and Y, and f x ( x) is the density for X alone, 
then the conditional density of Y given X is given 
by Jy,x(yJx) = fxy(x,y)ffx(x). Using the density 
function we can then compute the probability by inte­
grating as usual. Further details can be found in any 
standard text on probability (for instance [Papoulis 
1984]). 
To use this approach, we need to identify a random 
variable X and value b such that M(q) corresponds 
to the event X = b. The choice of random variable 
is crucial; we can easily have two random variables X 
and X' such that X == b and X' = b are the same 
event, yet conditioning on X =band X'= b leads to 
different results, since X and X' have different density 
functions. In our case there is an obvious choice of 
random variable, given our description of the situation: 
PrnQ(RtiR). With this choice of random variable, it 
is easy to see that the two approaches give us the same 
answer; the use of the density function corresponds to 
considering a small interval around PrnQ(RtiR} = q, 
and then considering the limit as the interval width 
tends to 0. 
Before computing the result of conditioning on M(q) 
(under either approach), it turns out to be use­
ful to do some more general computations. Since 
Pr';;�c(RtiR) = af(a +b), we have 
Prjj�'Q(PrnQ(RtiR) < q) 
1q r t-a. 11-a.-b d a=O h=a(l-q) c=O 1 cdbda 
q 11 rl a11-a-b1dcdhda a.=O Jb=O c=O 
=
 6 r 1
1
-a 11-a-b 1dcdhda 
Ja=O b=� c=O q 
= 
6 1:0 1:�;1_•1 (1- a- b) dbda q 
lq (q- a)2 
== 
6 
22 da a=O q 
= q 
Two other results, which are derived in a similar fash­
ion, also tmn out to be useful: 
Prj/;Q(PrnQ(B) < p) = (3- 2p)p2, and (1) 
Prjj�Q(Prnq(R1IR) < qAPrnQ(B) < p) == q(3-2p)p2 . 
The point here is not just the values themselves, but, 
more importantly, that the final distribution function 
is the product of the first two. That is, the events 
PrHq(B) < p and Prnq(R1 JR) < q are independent! 
This is of course extremely intuitive: It seems reason" 
able that HQ's beliefs about the probability of Judy 
being in Blue Territory should be independent of HQ's 
beliefs of her being in Red HQ area, given that she is 
in Red territory. 
Using this, it is trivial to prove the following proposi" 
tion, which holds whether we choose to use any par" 
ticular t: > 0, or if we use the standard definition of 
conditioning on the value of a random variable (which, 
as we have said, essentially corresponds to considering 
the limit as t-> 0). In this proposition, pr8(p) denotes 
the density function for the random variable Prm�(B); 
i.e., prB(P) = dPrJ/HQ(PraQ{B) < p)jdp. Similarly, 
prB (P I M(q)) = dPrJ/HQ(PrnQ(B) < PI M(q))/dp. 
(Note that from (1), it immediately follows that 
pr8(p) = 6p- 6p2, although we do not need this fact 
for the next result.) 
Proposition 2.1 : In (P HQ, Prjj�rQ), the events 
PrnQ(B) = p and M(q) are independent. Formally, 
prB(P) = pr8(pJM(q)). 
With this result, we are very close to showing that 
Judy's beliefs regarding the probability of her be­
ing in Blue territory don't change as a result of the 
message. Notice that Prj�Q is a distribution on 
PnQ, that is, on Judy's beliefs about HQ's beliefs 
regarding where Judy is . The posterior distribution 
Prj/HQ(·) = Prj/;Q(·I M(q)) is still a distribution on 
Pnq. As a result of conditioning, Judy revises her 
beliefs about HQ's beliefs. But to determine Judy's 
beliefs about where she is we need a distribution on 
{ Rt, R2, Bt, B2 }. The question is how Judy's beliefs 
about HQ's beliefs about where she is are related to 
her beliefs about where she is. Notice that there is 
no necessary relation. After all, for all we know, Judy 
might think that HQ has no reliable information, and 
thus decide to ignore HQ's statement when forming her 
opinion regarding where she is. But, in keeping with 
the spirit of the story, we assume that Judy trusts HQ, 
and thus forms her beliefs by taking expectations over 
her beliefs about HQ's beliefs. For example, if Judy 
was certain that HQ was certain that she was in Blue 
territory, then she would ascribe probability 1 to being 
in Blue territory. More generally, Judy weights HQ's 
beliefs according to her beliefs about how likely it is 
that HQ holds those beliefs. We formalize this trust 
assumption as follows: 
(Trust) At any point in time, Judy's beliefs about 
any event in the space {R1, R2, B1. B2} are 
formed by taking expectations of HQ's probability 
of the same event, according to Judy's distribu­
tion over HQ's possible beliefs. Formally, we have: 
Pr�(E) 
= f Pr�; HQ(Pr';J8c) Pr';J8c(E) dabc 
lPr�·�cEP HQ 
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(
= 1:0 prk(e) e de) 
for t E {prior} U [0, 1]. (In the second line, which 
follows from standard probability theory, pr}.;(e) 
is the density function of the random variable 
Pr�8c(E); i.e., pr1; (e) = dPr�/HQ(Pr�8c(E) < 
e)jde.) 
Note that when we apply this rule before Judy receives 
the message, so that t = prior, we have Pr�;'-ior(B1) = 
Pr�rior(B2) = Prrior(Rl) = Prrior(R2) = 1/4, which 
is consistent with our earlier assumption that Judy 
started with a uniform prior on { Bt, B2, Rt, R2}. 
The desired result now follows quite readily using the 
trust principle after Judy has received M(q). The re­
sult is that, no matter what the value of q is, her beliefs 
regarding being in Blue territory remain unchanged, 
exactly in accord with most people's strong intuitions. 
Theorem 2.2: Pr'j(B) = 1/2 for all q E [0, 1]. 
Proof: 
Prj(B) { Prj/HQ(Pr';[8c) Pr';j�c(B) dabc }p,�·Q•EPHQ 
= i:/rB(PIM(q))pdp 
1:0 
pr8(p) pdp (by Theorem 2.2) 
1:0 (6p- 6p2)p dp (from (1)) 
= 1/2. I 
Note that this theorem applies even if q = 1. Van 
Fraassen would interpret the message M(l) as mean­
ing that Judy is definitely not in R2. We interpret 
this it as PrnQ(R1IR) E [1 - t:, 1] for some (arbitrar­
ily) small and unspecified € > 0. Although the two 
interpretations seem close (after all, they differ by at 
most t: in the probability that they assign to R1 and 
R2), they are not equivalent. As Theorem 2.2 shows, 
this is a significant difference. It is the claimed equiv­
alence of the two interpretations that was behind van 
Fraassen's first principle, and hence his rejection of the 
intuitive answer that Prj (B) = 1/2. This equivalence 
may be correct under van Fraassen's constraint based 
interpretation of M, but it is not inevitable under our 
alternative reading, in which M is indeed a factual 
announcement (but about HQ's beliefs, not Judy's). 
3 DISCUSSION 
It is worth reviewing the assumptions that were nec­
essary for us to prove Theorem 2.2. We assumed: 
1. HQ's belief as to where Judy is can be 
characterized by a distribution on the space 
{Rt, R2,B1, B2}. 
2. Judy's beliefs regarding HQ's beliefs were 
characterized by the uniform distribution on 
HQ's beliefs, when parameterized by the tuple 
(PrsQ(RI), PrsQ(R2), PrnQ(Bt )). 
3. The only messages that HQ could send were those 
of the form M(q), and the one that HQ did send 
was the one that correctly reflected HQ's beliefs. 
4. M(q) is interpreted as meaning that PrnQ(q) E 
[q - �, q + €], so that we can condition on this 
event. (However, our result holds no matter what 
t: is. Thus we can regard t: as an arbitrarily small 
and unknown nonzero quantity.) 
5. Judy's distribution on {Bt, B2, Rt, R2} was de­
rived by taking the expectation of her beliefs re­
garding HQ's beliefs. 
Although these assumptions seem to us quite reason­
able, they are clearly not the only assumptions that 
could have been made. It is certainly worth trying to 
understand to what extent our results depend on these 
assumptions, and in particular whether they can be ex­
tended to provide more general statements of how to 
update by probabilistic information. 
Where does this leave CE and all the other methods 
considered by van Fraassen and his colleagues? As we 
said in the introduction, such rules may be useful in 
certain cases, but we believe it is an important research 
question to understand and explain precisely when. 
We do not, in particular, find CE to give particularly 
plausible results in the JB problem. But how could 
this have been predicted in advance? 
The JB problem shows that we need more than just an 
axiomatic justification for the use of CE (or any other 
method of update). An alternative to the use of a rule 
is to do what we have done for the JB problem in this 
paper: that is, to try to "complete the picture" in as 
much detail as possible, so that ultimately all we need 
to do is condition. In practice, this may be unneces­
sarily complex and shortcuts (such as CE) might exist. 
However, it would be useful to understand better the 
assumptions that are necessary for their use to cor­
respond to conditioning. In any case we believe that 
some of the issues we addressed cannot be avoided: it 
will never be sensible to blindly apply a rule, like CE, 
to all information that merely "seems" probabilistic or 
can be reformulated as such. Rather, one must always 
think carefully about precisely what the information 
means. 
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